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DEATH BY IRRELEVANCE: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF VIRGINIA’S CONTINUED EXCLUSION OF PRISON
CONDITIONS EVIDENCE TO ASSESS THE FUTURE
DANGEROUSNESS OF CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
Andrew Lindsey*
This Note argues that Virginia statutory and case law requiring the exclusion of
prison conditions evidence in capital trials where the jury must determine defendants’
future dangerousness is unconstitutional. In Part I, I present certain portions of a
hypothetical capital trial in Virginia to introduce readers to the concepts of prison
conditions evidence and future dangerousness, and why they are important to capital
defendants. In Part II, I trace the development of the constitutional right that is vio-
lated by the exclusion of this evidence, as well as how Virginia has come to justify its
exclusionary stance based on a flawed standard of evidentiary irrelevance. In Part III,
I present various legal and logical arguments against this standard of irrelevance. In
Part IV, I offer explanations as to why this standard of irrelevance has remained un-
corrected, and draw conclusions about a potential solution.
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I.
A. A Hypothetical Illustration of What Prison Conditions Evidence Is and
How It Relates to Future Dangerousness in a Capital Trial
Imagine you are a criminal defense lawyer in Virginia. One day you end up
representing a Virginia resident in his late sixties who is on trial for capital murder.1
The indictment alleges that your client abducted a little girl in his neighborhood and
committed acts of sexual misconduct with her before ultimately strangling her with
a plastic bag and burying her body in a nearby patch of woods.2 The Assistant Com-
monwealth Attorney prosecuting the case has a considerable amount of evidence
against your client, and the jury eventually produces a guilty verdict despite your
best efforts to raise a reasonable doubt that your client committed the crime. At this
point, the trial procedurally shifts from what is commonly referred to as the “guilt
phase” to the “penalty phase”3—the difference being that in the guilt phase the jury
is only deciding whether your client committed the crime and in the penalty phase
it is only deciding what his punishment should be for that crime.4
In the penalty phase, the prosecution will have to prove at least one of two sen-
tencing factors (known as “aggravators”) before the jury can impose a death sen-
tence;5 either that the defendant would probably pose a “continuing serious threat
1 The Virginia Code lists the fifteen different ways one can commit “capital murder” in
Virginia, which (like in many other states) is an offense that is punishable either by execution
or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2012);
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2010).
2 Under Section 18.2-31 this could qualify either as “[t]he willful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated killing of any person in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape,
forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object sexual penetration,” or “[t]he willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of a person under the age of fourteen by a person age
twenty-one or older.” § 18.2-31.
3 This is also referred to as the “sentencing phase,” and I use these terms interchangeably
throughout this paper.
4 This procedural division of capital trials is known as “bifurcation,” and it is done in an
attempt to protect defendants from hasty or overly impassioned jury sentences that do not
properly account for reasons why a particular defendant’s life should be spared. Bifurcation
is statutorily required in Virginia under Section 19.2-264.4.
5 This does not mean, however, that the jury must impose a sentence of death once either
of these aggravators is proven. Even if both aggravators are proven, it would be unconsti-
tutional to require a death sentence in any capital trial. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
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to society” if imprisoned for life, or that his conduct in committing the crime “was
outrageously or wantonly vile.”6 The former is referred to as the “future dangerous-
ness aggravator” and is a typical aggravator included in several state capital sentenc-
ing statutes.7 The latter aggravator is referred to as the “vileness aggravator”8 but is
less important for purposes of this paper.
To cover his tracks, the prosecutor attempts to prove that both aggravators apply
to your client in case you are successful in disputing one of them. One way to suc-
cessfully dispute these aggravators would be to present countervailing sentencing
factors known as “mitigators,” which are facts such as a defendant’s lack of a sig-
nificant prior criminal record or the defendant’s age at the time he committed the
offense.9 These factors are the opposite of aggravators because they are reasons why
a defendant should be spared from a death sentence.10 Another way to dispute ag-
gravators would be to directly rebut the application of them to your client by prov-
ing that he neither committed his crime in a particularly vile way nor is he a future
danger to society.11
Attempting to save your client’s life by killing two birds with one stone, you
approach the jury box and make the following remarks:
Ladies and gentlemen, no one can dispute the fact that the victim
suffered a disturbingly tragic fate at the hands of my client, but he
is now nearing his seventieth birthday and has an otherwise pris-
177–78 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also infra Part II.A.
6 § 19.2-264.4. The necessity of proving definable aggravators to the sentencer before
executing a defendant is a central development of constitutional jurisprudence under the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, which prohibits juries from im-
posing death sentences in an arbitrary or capricious manner. See generally infra Part II.A
(discussing the historical development of capital jurisprudence beginning in the late 1900s).
7 For an example of another state’s statutory formulation of this aggravator, see TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2013) (“[W]hether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society . . . .”). Virginia’s formulation in Section 19.2-264.4 used to be identical to Texas’s for-
mulation. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (Va. 1978) (stating that Virginia’s
statutory “language defining the first aggravating circumstance, i.e., the potential ‘dangerousness’
of the defendant, is identical to that in the Texas statute upheld in Jurek [v. Texas]”).
8 See generally Douglas R. Banghart, Vileness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J.
77 (1999).
9 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (2010).
10 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (describing a
“mitigating factor” as “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death”).
11 Although the distinction illustrated here between mitigating against capital aggravators
and rebutting capital aggravators is important in some legal and strategic contexts, see, e.g.,
infra note 75 and accompanying text, it is not consequential in terms of the constitutional right
to due process and I generally mention these concepts interchangeably throughout this paper.
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tine legal record. Execution is not your only option for punishing
this man, and it is unnecessary for two people to die from this
crime instead of one. Instead, you can sentence him to live out
the rest of his few remaining years under maximum security in
a state prison without the possibility for parole,12 where he will
have no access to plastic bags or children, and where his pedo-
philia will not pose a danger to other adult male inmates or armed
prison guards. In a minute I will call an officer from the Virginia
Department of Corrections to the stand to explain that under max-
imum security conditions, my client will not have a cellmate, and
will not be let out of his cell for more than a few hours a day.13
You are interrupted mid-sentence as the prosecutor suddenly rises to his feet
and states:
Your honor, I object to counsel’s comments about prison guards,
other inmates, and his proposed witness testimony on general
prison protocols. This amounts to evidence of what prison life is
like for any defendant sentenced to life in prison for any Class 1
felony in this state, and the Virginia Supreme Court has made
clear through numerous decisions14 that this kind of evidence is
completely irrelevant to sentencing. I further request that these
remarks be stricken from the record and that defense counsel be
prevented from presenting any more evidence that does not re-
late uniquely to this defendant or his crime.
As you begin to respond to the objection the judge halts you and orders the
jurors to take a ten-minute recess so that they do not incidentally hear anything more
of what you might say. Once they have exited the courtroom the judge signals for
you to proceed with your response:
Your honor, opposing counsel has explicitly argued to the jury
that my client will pose a serious future danger to society if he
is allowed to remain alive in our state prison system, and nothing
12 Informing a jury that a life imprisonment sentence for a capital offense carries no
possibility for parole under state law has been recognized as a constitutional right for capital
defendants. See infra Part III.A.
13 See generally U.S.: Red Onion State Prison: Super-Maximum Security Confinement
in Virginia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 1, 1999), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid
/3ae6a84f8.html (describing the treatment of inmates in Virginia’s “super-maximum secu-
rity” prisons).
14 These decisions are comprehensively surveyed in Part II.B.
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could be more relevant in disputing this contention than the
actual security conditions that he will be subjected to while in-
carcerated. Short of breaking out of prison, how is an elderly man
like my client going to harm anyone further if he doesn’t have
a cellmate and is locked down for twenty-something hours a day
in nearly complete isolation? This is central to my client’s defense,
and he has a constitutional right to rebut the prosecution’s case
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15
Acknowledging your response, the judge replies:
Counselor, I see where you are coming from, but opposing
counsel is absolutely right that this sort of general evidence
about prison life for inmates has been ruled irrelevant on every
single occasion the Virginia Supreme Court has addressed the
matter. These decisions are clear and I have to follow them, so
I’m going to sustain the objection. If you have any other evi-
dence that pertains directly to your client’s criminal record,
character, or the circumstances of his offense, you are free to
present it to the jury.16
Having none, you finish presenting the rest of your mitigation evidence, and rest
your case. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury retires to another room
to begin deliberating the verdict. It is not long before you see the bailiff being
summoned back-and-forth between the deliberation room and the judge’s bench
carrying pieces of paper in his hand. You are informed that he is passing handwrit-
ten notes from the jurors to the judge, asking specific questions about the conditions
of incarceration that they want to know before sentencing your client.17 The questions
ask things like, “Will the defendant ever share a prison cell with another inmate?”;
“How much free time will the defendant be able to spend outside of his cell per
week?”; and “Will the defendant ever be allowed to mix with the general inmate
15 The development of the due process “right to rebut” and its implications for intro-
ducing evidence of prison conditions in Virginia are examined in Parts II and III, respectively.
16 These are the only three categories of evidence that are considered to be legally relevant
in Virginia for proving or disproving the future dangerousness aggravator. See infra Part II.B;
see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (2010) (explicitly mentioning “evidence of the prior
history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense
of which he is accused”).
17 This process of jurors sending inquiries to the judge during deliberations about matters
they are still unsure of after the close of the evidence is not an infrequent occurrence in
capital trials, and defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to be notified of the judge’s
responses. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1975).
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population during meals, showers, or leisure time?”18 You repeat your request to in-
troduce evidence on these questions before the court, and the judge again denies your
request. Instead, he issues the following response to the jury:
All the information I can provide concerning the potential conse-
quences of the sentence you choose for the defendant is set forth
in the jury instructions you were given. Further information
about the incarceration conditions that the defendant would be
subjected to as a consequence of his sentence is not a proper
issue for your consideration, and you are accordingly instructed
not to give any weight to such information—whether based on
personal speculation or comments made by counsel—during
your deliberations.19
An hour or so later the jurors file back into the courtroom and take their seats
while the person they elected to be their foreman hands their verdict to the judge.
You and your client remain standing as the judge announces that the jury, having
found the future dangerousness aggravator to have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the evidence before it, has sentenced your client to be executed by
intravenous injection. As court personnel handcuffs your client and begin to escort
him out of the room, you look at him for the last time and wish him luck in his
continued struggle to avoid death at the hands of the law. You both know that you
fought your hardest, and that his sentence would probably be different had you been
able to present your prison conditions evidence to the jury. Your client will probably
appeal both his conviction and his sentence—delaying his scheduled execution by
approximately five to six years20—and the impropriety of the trial judge’s exclusion
of the prison conditions evidence will be one of the many arguments his appellate
lawyers make for reversing his death sentence. You head back to your office to get
started on the next case, hoping that the Constitution is that much stronger by the
time your client’s case reaches the Supreme Court of Virginia for review.21
18 These questions are modeled after jury inquiries from a capital case in South Dakota.
See Rhines v. Weber, 608 N.W.2d 303, 310 (S.D. 2000). For an example of jury inquiries
about future dangerousness in a Virginia capital case, see Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d
695, 716 (Va. 2002).
19 This response instruction is jointly modeled after the response instructions given in the
cases mentioned in the previous footnote, see Rhines, 608 N.W.2d at 310; Bell, 563 S.E.2d
at 716, as well as the trial that lead to the famous future dangerousness case of Simmons v.
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160 (1994), discussed infra Part III.A.
20 See Charlene Hall, Capital Offense Conviction Appeals Process in Virginia, PRO-
DEATH PENALTY.COM, http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/virginia/capitalappeals.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014).
21 See id. (“A defendant who is sentenced to death is [statutorily] entitled to an automatic
appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.”).
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II.
A. The General Constitutional Right to Rebut in Capital Cases
The right of a defendant to “respond to the . . . case against him”22 is perhaps the
most intuitive and necessary right of any regime with an adversarial legal system.
Without this basic right, it would be impossible to justify the deprivation of life,
liberty, or property upon any notion of fairness, as litigation would be a one-sided
charade. In the criminal context, “this right to rebut the prosecutor’s arguments is
a ‘hallmar[k] of due process’”23 and thus a “‘fundamental constitutional right.’”24
Due to the age and breadth of this right, its specific guarantees were never compre-
hensively delineated by a single landmark case. Instead, numerous formulations of
its guarantees were developed over time25 that came to embrace other related pro-
visions of the Constitution.26
There are many ways that the right to rebut can be violated, but the classic
violation that arises in the context of evidentiary rulings is when the prosecution is
“permitted to exclude competent, reliable[, and exculpatory] evidence . . . [which]
is central to the defendant’s claim[s] . . . [i]n the absence of any valid state justifica-
tion [for] exclusion.”27 Federal and state rules of evidence contain justifications for
excluding evidence in criminal and civil litigation,28 and the right to rebut does not
override these rules when they are properly designed and applied.29 But these rules
become constitutionally invalid when they are “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve,” and they “infringe[ ] upon a weighty interest
of the accused.”30 Avoiding a government-imposed death is arguably the weightiest
22 O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 171 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 Id. (quoting Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 175 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
24 Id. (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687 (1986)).
25 See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (restating the right as “a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948) (restating the right as a defendant’s “opportunity to be heard in his defense”).
26 See, e.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (“Whether rooted di-
rectly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process
or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal de-
fendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” (quoting Crane, 476 U.S.
at 690) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27 Crane, 476 U.S. at 690.
28 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 2–4 (7th ed. 2011). One of these justifications is irrele-
vance. Id. at 49.
29 Id. at 760–61 (giving various examples of when evidentiary concerns for reliability and
the integrity of the attorney-client privilege can trump the right to rebut).
30 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
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legal interest of all, and evidence rules inflict the ultimate evidentiary injustice when
they improperly exclude evidence that could have saved a defendant’s life.
Consequently, capital defendants are viewed as the most in need of constitu-
tional protections during trial,31 and they retain the right to rebut in sentencing pro-
ceedings.32 For most of our nation’s history, states were permitted to conduct the
capital-sentencing process in a highly unrestricted manner, and the imposition of
death sentences became so unguided and comparatively erratic that the Supreme
Court eventually declared the states’ administration of the death penalty unconstitu-
tional.33 In the wake of this monumental decision, states attempted to salvage their
invalidated capital punishment schemes by amending their criminal codes to provide
greater procedural protections for capital defendants.34 These procedural protections
31 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“There is no
question that death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability. When a
defendant’s life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensitive to insure that every
[constitutional] safeguard is observed.” (citations omitted)).
32 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he [capital]
sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.”).
33 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion). As one of the Justices
phrased it:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted
of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968 . . . the petitioners are among
a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has . . . been imposed. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freak-
ishly imposed.
Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). This oscillating justification between the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments for the Court’s inroads against states’ capital practices has largely
endured, and is a primary reason why many of the Court’s capital decisions continue to fea-
ture complicated, narrow holdings comprised of shifting pluralities and coalitions of Justices.
For an example of this in the context of future dangerousness cases, see Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 179–80 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[R]egard[ing] . . . the new
schemes of capital sentencing imposed upon the States by this Court’s recent [future danger-
ousness] jurisprudence . . . [t]he opinions of Justice BLACKMUN and Justice O’CONNOR
rely on the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, rather than on the Eighth
Amendment’s ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ prohibition, as applied to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. But the prior law applicable to that subject indicates that petitioner’s
due process rights would be violated if he was ‘sentenced to death on the basis of informa-
tion which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.’ . . . Both opinions try to bring this case
within that description, but it does not fit.” (citations omitted)).
34 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–80 (stating that as part of “the legislative response to
Furman . . . [t]he legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted new statutes that provide
for the death penalty . . . . These recently adopted statutes have attempted to address the con-
cerns expressed by the Court in Furman primarily (i) by specifying the factors to be weighed
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ushered in standard features of state capital trials and sentencing proceedings as they
are conducted today, such as bifurcation of the guilt and penalty phases, and the
creation of statutory aggravators and mitigators to reasonably confine the penal
discretion of the sentencer.35 Automatic appellate review after a capital conviction
was also implemented by some states to further protect capital defendants.36
These additional protections further entailed corresponding expansions of the
types of evidence available for capital defendants to use in their defense.37 Although
some states’ statutes were again invalidated in a subsequent, related case despite
their enacted reforms,38 the Justices devoted notable portions of that opinion for ac-
knowledging that their prior decision was an enormously disruptive judicial intru-
sion into traditional areas of state power, and indicated hesitance to ever produce
another capital decision of such magnitude again.39 Accordingly, the Court has since
and the procedures to be followed in deciding when to impose a capital sentence, or (ii) by
making the death penalty mandatory for specified crimes”); see also Jason J. Solomon, Future
Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55 (1999) (“In 1976, the waves created
by Furman v. Georgia were cascading across the land. States faced with emptied death rows
scrambled to find constitutionally acceptable ways to impose the ultimate punishment.”).
35 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162–64 (“[T]he Georgia statutory scheme for the imposition
of the death penalty . . . as amended after our decision in Furman [now provides that] . . .
[t]he capital defendant’s guilt or innocence is determined . . . in the first stage of a bifurcated
trial [after which] . . . [t]he judge [or jury] shall hear additional evidence in extenuation,
mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convic-
tions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any
prior conviction and pleas . . . . The judge [or jury] shall also hear argument by the defendant
or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney regarding the punishment to be imposed.” (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36 Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, What One Hand Giveth, the Other Taketh Away: How Future
Dangerousness Corrupts Guilty Verdicts and Produces Premature Punishment Decisions
in Capital Cases, 32 PACE L. REV. 447, 449 n.9 (2012). As mentioned supra in note 21,
Virginia is one of these states.
37 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164 (“The defendant is accorded substantial latitude as to the types
of evidence that he may introduce. Evidence considered during the guilt stage may be con-
sidered during the sentencing stage without being resubmitted.”).
38 See id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Adam L. VanGrack, Serious Error
with “Serious Error”: Repairing A Broken System of Capital Punishment, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 973, 999–1000 n.206 (2001) (“The 1976 Supreme Court decision reinstituting capital
punishment, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), allowed capital punishment to exist only
if the process included a bifurcated trial.” (emphasis added)).
39 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176 (“Caution is necessary lest this Court become, under
the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the standards of
criminal responsibility throughout the country. A decision that a given punishment is imper-
missible under the Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a constitutional amendment.
The ability of the people to express their preference through the normal democratic processes,
as well as through ballot referenda, is shut off [by decisions like Furman]. Revisions cannot be
made in the light of further experience.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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protected states’ use of the future dangerousness aggravator against constitutional
attacks,40 as well as defendants’ right to rebut this aggravator.41 The Court has also
consistently acknowledged that predicting a person’s future behavior, capital defen-
dant or otherwise, is a “difficult”42 task for the sentencer. Consequently, the Court
has held that it is “‘essential . . . that the jury have before it all possible relevant
information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.’”43
This individualized consideration of the defendant by a jury44 is a unique and
“constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death,”45
and is consistent with affording capital defendants the comparatively greatest amount
of procedural protection.46 Challenges to state laws which exclude certain evidence
The Court’s institutional concern over the substantial federalism implications that Furman
triggered in the capital context has not abated, but rather recurs in the disagreements which
continue to plague some of its capital jurisprudence.
40 E.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of Texas’s
future dangerousness aggravator). This decision in particular was heavily relied on in the first
case to sustain Virginia’s future dangerousness statute from a challenge of unconstitutional
vagueness. See Solomon, supra note 34, at 56–60.
41 See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986) (“Where the prosecution
specifically relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in asking for the death penalty, it
is not only [precedent] that requires that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to intro-
duce evidence on this point; it is also the elemental due-process requirement that a defendant
not be sentenced to death ‘on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny
or explain.’” (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977))).
42 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002 (1983) (quoting Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274). Some
argue that this task is so difficult that even with expert evidence, death sentences should not
be predicated on future dangerousness predictions. See, e.g., Eugenia T. La Fontaine, A
Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why Expert Predictions of Future Danger-
ousness in Capital Cases Are Unconstitutional, 44 B.C. L. REV. 207 (2002).
43 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1003 (quoting Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276).
44 The Supreme Court has held that when statutory aggravators must be found in order
to sentence a defendant to death, the aggravators effectively operate as elements of a dif-
ferent crime entailing greater punishment (that is, a crime with a maximum punishment of
death as opposed to life imprisonment), and thus must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
to a jury rather than proven by some less-demanding standard to a judge. Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
45 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e cannot avoid the conclusion that an
individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in
a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more im-
portant than in noncapital cases . . . [where a] variety of . . . postconviction remedies may be
available to modify an initial sentence of confinement in noncapital cases.”); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that the holding of Furman v.
Georgia was that “the decision to impose [the death penalty] had to be guided by standards
so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime
and the defendant”).
46 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
2014] DEATH BY IRRELEVANCE 1267
from being introduced to rebut future dangerousness are unsuccessful when those
laws assure that all possible relevant information about the individual defendant
“‘will be adduced.’”47 As many have recognized, the advent of this liberal, individu-
alized standard of consideration in capital jurisprudence was clearly meant to effect
a one-way advantage for capital defendants seeking to avoid death sentences.48 How-
ever, as shown below, Virginia has succeeded in turning this standard on its head in
the context of prison conditions evidence.49
B. The Lockett v. Ohio Standard of Relevance and Virginia’s Approach to
Excluding Prison Conditions Evidence in Future Dangerousness Cases
It was not until Lockett v. Ohio that the Court specifically confronted the crucial
question of what adduced information is “‘relevant’” for rebutting capital aggrava-
tors.50 The Court concluded that it is unconstitutional to exclude evidence of “any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”51 The
Court attached an important footnote to this conclusion (Footnote 12) that stated
“[n]othing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as
irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense.”52 Because the Ohio sentencing statute in question did
not permit the jury to choose life imprisonment over death on the basis of this evi-
dence, it was declared unconstitutional.53
Lockett was decided after the Court’s series of watershed, fractured decisions54
mentioned above on the constitutionality of the death penalty, which understandably
“engendered confusion”55 amongst the states as to what revisions were required in
order for their capital-punishment statutes to survive constitutional challenges. These
decisions were relatively close together in time, and the Lockett Court explicitly
47 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1003 (quoting Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276).
48 See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141–42 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[O]ver the years since 1972 this Court has attached to the imposition of the death penalty
two quite [defendant-friendly] sets of commands: The sentencer’s discretion to impose death
must be closely confined, but the sentencer’s discretion not to impose death (to extend mercy)
must be unlimited . . . .”(citations omitted)).
49 See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
50 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 604 n.12 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 608–09.
54 Id. at 598–600 (discussing the highly divergent stances taken by Justices in the Furman
and Gregg pluralities).
55 Id. at 599.
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characterized its ruling as an attempt to eliminate this confusion.56 Accordingly, the
Footnote 12 language concerning relevant mitigation evidence was incorporated
directly (and oftentimes verbatim) into subsequent state court decisions interpreting
the boundaries of capital defendants’ right to present mitigation evidence.57
Virginia was one such state, and the exact language of the Footnote 12 is fea-
tured prominently in the first Virginia Supreme Court opinion to establish the prac-
tice of excluding “prison life”58 evidence.59 The defendant, Brian Cherrix, sought to
dispute the claim that he would be a future danger to society by introducing evi-
dence from various social science experts, officials from the Virginia Department
of Corrections, and from an inmate currently serving a life sentence regarding “the
ability of the penal system to contain Cherrix.”60 Although “immaterial[ity]” was
only one of several grounds listed by the trial court for excluding this evidence,61 it
was regarded as the singularly sufficient reason for exclusion in the Virginia Su-
preme Court’s analysis.62 Unwilling to tether Cherrix’s proposed evidence to one of
the three airtight Footnote 12 categories, the Cherrix court concluded that “[a]s the
56 Id. at 602 (“The signals from this Court have not, however, always been easy to decipher.
The States now deserve the clearest guidance that the Court can provide; we have an obliga-
tion to reconcile previously differing views in order to provide that guidance.”).
57 For examples of this shortly after the Lockett decision, see Horton v. State, 295 S.E.2d
281, 284 (Ga. 1982), Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 815 (Miss. 1984), and State v.
Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tenn. 1982).
58 This is the term generally used by the Virginia Supreme Court to refer to evidence con-
cerning any aspect of the conditions that prison inmates are subjected to while incarcerated.
Although the Virginia court’s frequent reference to this type of evidence as “the general na-
ture of prison life” or “what prison life would be like for [the defendant] if he received a life
sentence” potentially carries a dismissive, belittling connotation of those conditions and the
evidentiary points for which they are offered, it nonetheless has come to embrace all features
of the incarceration experience including security measures in Virginia’s various prisons. For
an example of the Virginia Supreme Court’s use of “prison life,” see Burns v. Common-
wealth, 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001). To avoid this connotation, I generally use the term
“prison conditions” instead of “prison life” when referring to this kind of evidence through-
out my paper.
59 Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873
(1999) (“Although the United States Constitution guarantees the defendant in a capital case
a right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencing authority, it does not limit ‘the tra-
ditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s
character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.’” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 605 n.12 (1978))).
60 Id.
61 The trial court also mentioned the timeliness of Cherrix’s corresponding motions and
the cost estimates of arranging for some of the witnesses to testify. Id. These reasons more
closely resemble the traditional authority of a court to exclude evidence, even if it is relevant.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing federal trial courts to exclude relevant evidence on
grounds including “undue delay” and “wasting [of] time”).
62 Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653.
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trial court observed, none of this evidence concerns the history or experience of the
defendant. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that ‘what a person may
expect in the penal system’ is not relevant mitigation evidence.”63 In a footnote to
its conclusion,64 the court distinguished this evidence from that in a U.S. Supreme
Court case called Skipper v. South Carolina,65 where the Court upheld the defen-
dant’s right to admit as mitigating evidence testimony by jailers and a regular visitor
describing defendant’s good behavior during the seven months he spent in jail
awaiting his trial.66
The fact that Cherrix was the first decision by the Virginia Supreme Court to
rule on prison conditions evidence is evinced by the opinion’s cursory analysis and
lack of citation to any other Virginia precedent on the matter. This is probably par-
tially attributable to the enactment of a new law just a few years before Cherrix that
made “[a]ny person sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony offense com-
mitted on or after January 1, 1995 . . . [in]eligible for parole.”67 However, every
subsequent Virginia Supreme Court case dealing with prison conditions evidence
either cites directly back to Cherrix, or refers to an intervening case that contains a
direct citation to the decision.68
Walker v. Commonwealth69 was the first case to follow Cherrix and was decided
within the same year, dedicating even less attention to the defendant’s arguments
supporting admission of prison conditions evidence.70 A year later, a new attempt
to convince the court to admit prison conditions evidence was made in Lovitt v.
Commonwealth71 by arguing that “the only [relevant] society” for the jury’s consid-
eration of defendant’s “future dangerousness was prison society” because the de-
fendant was ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison.72 This argument was
63 Id.
64 Id. at n.4.
65 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
66 Id. at 4.
67 VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (1994). This unavailability of parole for defendants con-
victed of capital offenses strengthens the argument that they would not be a future danger to
society if given a life imprisonment sentence because the only other ways they could reenter
society would be to break out of prison or receive executive clemency for the felony convic-
tions pursuant to Article 5, Section 12 of the Virginia Constitution—both considerable feats
for any inmate in any Virginia prison.
68 See, e.g., Teleguz v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 688 S.E.2d 865, 879 (Va. 2010);
Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 563 (Va. 2009).
69 515 S.E.2d 565 (Va. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000).
70 Id. at 574 (“Walker asserts that this evidence was relevant and properly admissible be-
cause it would mitigate against his receiving the death penalty, and therefore, the trial court
erred in refusing to admit it. However, we have previously held that such testimony is not
proper mitigating evidence.” (citing Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (1999))).
71 537 S.E.2d 866 (Va. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001).
72 Id. at 878. This conceptual distinction between society at large and “prison society”
when assessing the alleged future dangerousness of capital defendants has been advocated
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sufficiently unique that the court was not able to rely solely on Cherrix and Walker
in rejecting the argument as it had before. Instead, the Lovitt court characterized the
argument as an “effective request that we rewrite the [future dangerousness] statute
to restrict its scope.”73
Yet another innovative attempt was unsuccessful the following year in Burns v.
Commonwealth,74 where a defendant argued (in addition to the general relevance
argument from Cherrix and the prison society argument from Lovitt) that all of the
prior Virginia Supreme Court decisions excluding prison life evidence, as well as
Lockett itself, did so in the context of mitigation evidence rather than rebuttal evi-
dence.75 After reiterating the prior holdings of Cherrix and Lovitt to reject Burns’s
familiar arguments, the court provided some new arguments in turn. The court
reasoned that because the prosecution did not open the door to such evidence by
making any related claims about the nature of prison life (such as the general
incidence of inmate-caused violence or escapes), “Burns’ evidence was not in re-
buttal to any evidence concerning prison life.”76 The court also emphasized that the
literal language of the future dangerousness statute77 focused on whether a defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence, as opposed to whether a defendant could
commit criminal acts of violence.78 The court described this as being consonant with
the individualized consideration requirement of capital cases.79 Finally, the court
in many other state and federal cases on the subject, and I address its usefulness in Parts III
and IV. For another example of when this argument was acknowledged in a U.S. Supreme
Court case, see Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 261 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(“That today’s decision departs from Simmons is evident from the Court’s rejection of the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s distinction between evidence regarding danger to fellow inmates
and evidence regarding danger to society at large. Simmons itself recognized this distinction.”).
73 Lovitt, 537 S.E.2d at 879. By rejecting the prison society argument on state statutory
interpretation grounds, the court directly contravened the Simmons Court’s acceptance of the
“logic and effectiveness of [this] argument” in life-without-parole future dangerousness cases.
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165–66 (1994) (plurality opinion). Unfortunately,
the Lovitt court ignored the obvious truth that any state statute at odds with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution should be restrictively rewritten.
74 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001).
75 Id. at 892–93.
76 Id. at 893. This rationale seems to limit itself to the facts of Burns; however, like the
prison society argument, it too appears in many other prison conditions cases.
77 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2010) (“The penalty of death shall not be imposed un-
less the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society . . . .”).
78 Burns, 541 S.E.2d at 893. The apparent defect of this interpretation is addressed in Part IV.
79 Id. at 893–94. This twisted application of the individualized consideration standard is
blatantly at odds with all U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the matter except Lockett. As shown
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distinguished U.S. Supreme Court cases that Burns cited in his arguments,80 pointing
out that unlike Burns’s trial, those cases involved concealment of aggravator evi-
dence from the defendant,81 exclusion of evidence of the defendant’s good behavior
in jail while awaiting trial,82 and a refusal to inform the jury of parole ineligibility
when the prosecutor made it an issue in the case.83
The same year that Burns was decided, the Virginia Supreme Court extended
the implications of its exclusionary policy in Lenz v. Commonwealth84 to indigent
capital defendants seeking to appoint prison conditions experts as “basic tools of an
adequate defense”85 pursuant to corresponding U.S. Supreme Court decisions86 and
Virginia Supreme Court decisions.87 Because the standard for appointment of such
experts requires that the expert’s assistance “‘is likely to be a significant factor in
[a defendant’s case],’”88 the court denied the requested appointment of a former
commissioner of a state department of corrections to testify about how prison con-
ditions and procedures would affect the defendant’s future dangerousness assess-
ment.89 One year after Lenz, the defendant in Bell v. Commonwealth90 urged the
court to reconsider its stance from Cherrix and its progeny on prison conditions evi-
dence both in terms of its general relevance to mitigation and rebuttal arguments as
well as its importance related to requesting state-appointed experts.91 Edward Bell
made a slightly different argument from Lenz in that he claimed that evidence of
in supra note 45, the individualized consideration standard was intentionally designed to shield
capital defendants by providing them disproportionately more ways to escape death sentences
than to receive them. The Virginia Supreme Court’s interpretation effectively turns the stan-
dard into a sword against capital defendants, providing them with disproportionately fewer
avenues to address prosecutor’s future dangerousness arguments.
80 Burns, 541 S.E.2d at 893–94.
81 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
82 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
83 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion). The propriety of
distinguishing this case in particular from Burns and other Virginia Supreme Court prison
conditions decisions will be challenged in Part III.A.
84 544 S.E.2d 299 (Va. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001).
85 Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86 E.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (stating that when a defendant’s sanity is
at issue, the state must give access to a psychiatrist as a tool for an adequate defense).
87 E.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996) (stating that Virginia must,
upon request, provide indigent defendants “the basic tools of an adequate defense”).
88 Lenz, 544 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82–83).
89 Id. Though the court did not clearly articulate the reason behind this denial, it was pre-
sumably justified in light of the fact that the court had rejected prison conditions evidence
in every preceding case where it was an issue on appeal, such that the evidence would not
be a significant factor in the defendant’s case at all because it is generally inadmissible.
90 563 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003).
91 Id. at 713.
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prison life is inherently relevant to consideration of “‘future adaptability’”92 claims
(like the claim upheld in Skipper93) because “[a] jury . . . cannot assess a defendant’s
likelihood of adjusting to life in prison if evidence describing the conditions of
confinement is excluded from the jury’s consideration.”94 Perhaps in light of the
nuance of this argument, the court devoted a fair amount of attention to the defen-
dant’s claims before rejecting them.95
A period of four years separated Bell from the next case—Juniper v. Common-
wealth96—where a capital defendant unsuccessfully sought to introduce expert
prison conditions testimony by claiming that such testimony contained an individ-
ualized consideration of his future dangerousness in connection with the standard
prison life of inmates serving life without parole.97 Because the court was uncon-
vinced that the testimony was in fact individualized to the particular defendant,98 no
new arguments were advanced in dismissing defendant’s challenge to Virginia’s
prison conditions precedent.99
Two years later the court faced a similar challenge in Porter v. Commonwealth100
where the defendant sought to convince the court that his expert’s report describing
how prison conditions would reduce or eliminate his own potential for future dan-
gerousness was sufficiently particularized to escape the holding in Juniper.101 Other
than more robust challenges and information concerning generalized statistics of
violence among inmates serving life in prison, the court found the evidence no dif-
ferent than the evidence in Juniper and similarly affirmed its exclusion at trial.102
The most important prison conditions case decided after Porter was Morva v.
Commonwealth.103 Much like the defense in Porter sought to demonstrate enough
individualization in its prison conditions evidence to be distinguishable from the
rejected evidence in Juniper, William Morva sought to convince the court that his
expert testimony (which coincidentally involved the exact same expert utilized
92 Id.
93 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
94 Bell, 563 S.E.2d at 713.
95 Id. at 713–15.
96 626 S.E.2d 383 (Va. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 960 (2006).
97 See id. at 403.
98 Id. at 424.
99 See id.
100 661 S.E.2d 415 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1999 (2009).
101 Id. at 440.
102 Id. at 436–42. However, the extensiveness of the court’s treatment of each aspect of
Porter’s claims was unmatched by any of its prior prison conditions decisions. This is prob-
ably due to the comprehensive nature of Porter’s challenges, which questioned every prison
conditions holding starting from Cherrix and leading all the way up to Juniper.
103 683 S.E.2d 553 (Va. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 97 (2010).
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by Thomas Porter104) was sufficiently more individualized than that rejected in
Porter.105 Specifically, Morva’s expert proposed to
interpret Morva’s criminal history, capital murder conviction,
and projected life sentence in light of group statistical data re-
garding similarly situated inmates . . . [and in] consideration [of]
Morva’s prior behavior while incarcerated, his security require-
ments during prior incarcerations, his age, and his level of edu-
cational attainment. He also . . . [would analyze how] preventative
interventions and increased security measures could significant-
ly reduce the likelihood that Morva would engage in violence
in prison . . . .106
In affirming the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence, the opinion gave the
following acknowledgment:
It is true that, in this case, unlike Porter, [the expert] proposed
to provide testimony that concerns Morva’s history and back-
ground, prior behavior while incarcerated, age and educational
attainment, and such factors might bear on his adjustment to
prison. However, other testimony [the expert] proposed to give,
and to rely upon in giving a prison risk assessment for Morva,
such as potential security interventions that “could be brought
to bear” upon Morva, and the rates of assaults in the Virginia
Department of Corrections, is, by [the future dangerousness]
statute, not relevant to the determination the jury has to make
concerning Morva’s future dangerousness and therefore would
not be admissible evidence.107
In addition to repeating the black-letter holdings of all its prior cases rejecting
prison conditions evidence, the court expounded on its rationale of inadmissibility
by stating that “[i]ncreased security measures and conditions of prison life that
reduce the likelihood of future dangerousness of all inmates is general information
104 Id. at 563. Not surprisingly, the court’s awareness of this coincidence seemed to de-
crease its willingness to view Morva’s expert evidence as distinguishable from Porter’s.
105 See id. at 571–72 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 558. Focusing on individualized factors such as Morva’s conviction, criminal
history, age, and previous incarceration behavior was no doubt an attempt to invoke the ex-
plicitly approved categories of relevant future dangerousness evidence from Lockett and the
Virginia Code. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (2010).
107 Morva, 683 S.E.2d at 565.
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that is irrelevant to the inquiry required by [the future dangerousness statute].”108
Thus, Morva was the first Virginia case to affirm exclusion of partially admissible
prison conditions evidence conceded to reduce the likelihood of a defendant’s future
dangerousness simply because it was not entirely admissible under the Lockett stan-
dard of relevance enshrined in Virginia law.109
The final case of significance decided four years after Morva was Lawlor v.
Commonwealth.110 While there were other intervening cases between Morva and
Lawlor, they did not present any arguments or rulings of consequence to the develop-
ment of Virginia’s exclusionary stance on prison conditions evidence.111 In Lawlor,
defendant’s counsel sought to question prospective jurors during voir dire as to
“whether they could consider a sentence of life imprisonment without parole in the
absence of any evidence of prison security.”112 The trial judge prohibited these
questions, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, stating that
“[Virginia’s voir dire statute]113 does not entitle or permit the court or a party to
examine potential jurors to ascertain what effect the exclusion of irrelevant evidence
may have on their deliberations.”114 When combining Lawlor with all of the other
108 Id. (emphasis added). This statement is particularly important because it was the first
time the court deemed prison conditions evidence inadmissible by providing something more
than a conclusory assertion of irrelevance, generality, or application of the Lockett footnote
(in other words, that relevant evidence cannot both reduce the likelihood of future dangerous-
ness in a specific defendant’s projected setting of incarceration and simultaneously reduce
that likelihood for all other similarly situated inmates as well).
109 Normally when a court is posed with evidence which is partially admissible and par-
tially inadmissible, the conventional solution is to redact or exclude the inadmissible portions
and admit the rest. See, e.g., Randolph v. Commonwealth, 482 S.E.2d 101, 107–08 (Va. Ct.
App. 1997). The Morva court’s decision to permit the exclusion of the entire expert evidence
was therefore excessively detrimental to Morva’s defense, especially because he was on trial
for his life.
110 738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013).
111 These cases were Andrews v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 237 (Va. 2010), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2999 (2011) and Prieto v. Commonwealth, 721 S.E.2d 484 (Va. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 244 (2012). Andrews contained nothing new whatsoever; however, in Prieto the
defendant unsuccessfully motioned for the jury to be transported to Red Onion State Prison
so that it could see Prieto’s future prison conditions firsthand before deciding on his future
dangerousness to “society as a whole.” Prieto, 721 S.E.2d at 501–02. The court was predict-
ably unreceptive to this request. Id.
112 Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 864.
113 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (2010) (“The court and counsel for either party shall have
the right to examine under oath any person who is called as a juror therein and shall have the
right to ask such person or juror directly any relevant question to ascertain whether he is re-
lated to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion,
or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein . . . .”).
114 Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 865. It is not clear why the court found it appropriate to interpret
the word “relevant” in Section 8.01-358 the same way that it interprets that word in Footnote
12 or Rule 2:401 of the Virginia Rules of the Supreme Court (which defines the standard for
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holdings from Cherrix and its progeny, the result is that every capital defendant in
Virginia who is accused of being a future danger to society is virtually muzzled from
attempting to make arguments or introduce evidence pertaining to prison conditions
before the trial has even begun. This lasts all the way until the final appeal has been
exhausted. In this respect, Virginia’s steady evisceration of the right to rebut has
debased that right into something of a constitutional dream catcher—providing cap-
ital defendants with little more than phantasmal protection from the velvet fist of
Virginia’s capital legal regime.115
III.
A. The Post-Lockett Cases and the Right to Rebut
In the years following Lockett, a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases were
decided which seemed to expand the standard of relevance for rebutting capital
aggravators beyond the hermetic categories of Footnote 12. One such case was
Tennard v. Dretke,116 which reiterated language from many earlier post-Lockett
cases117 in stating:
When we addressed directly the relevance standard applicable to
mitigating evidence in [state] capital cases . . . we spoke in the
most expansive terms. We established that the meaning of rele-
vance is no different in the context of mitigating evidence intro-
duced in a capital sentencing proceeding than in any other
context, and thus the general evidentiary standard—any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence—applies . . . . Relevant
mitigating evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or
disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could rea-
sonably deem to have mitigating value . . . . Thus, a State cannot
“relevant evidence” in all Virginia trials). Presumably, the context of voir dire questioning
entails a more accommodating standard of relevance since it is geared toward ferreting out
hidden biases that are subliminally buried beneath jurors’ overt actions and opinions. This
is markedly more difficult than sticking within semantic boundaries of black-letter standards
of evidentiary relevance from statutes and cases.
115 Cf. Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553 (Va. 2009) (Koontz, J., dissenting) (“[I]n
my view, Morva was left with little, if any, defense to the imposition of the death penalty in
this case.”).
116 542 U.S. 274 (2004).
117 These cases included: Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); and Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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bar the consideration of . . . evidence if the sentencer could
reasonably find that it warrants a sentence less than death . . . .
Once this low threshold for relevance is met, the [Constitution]
requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a
capital defendant’s mitigating evidence . . . . We have held that
a State cannot preclude the sentencer from considering any rele-
vant mitigating evidence that the defendant proffers in support of
a sentence less than death . . . . [V]irtually no limits are placed
on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may
introduce concerning his own circumstances.118
With respect to future dangerousness evidence, the most significant of these
cases was Simmons v. South Carolina.119 During the sentencing phase of Simmons’s
trial, the prosecution argued that he would be a future danger to society if allowed
to remain alive.120 In deliberating Simmons’s punishment, the jurors asked the judge
to clarify whether Simmons would be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in
prison (unaware that the judge had specifically prohibited an instruction requested
by Simmons’s counsel which would have confirmed that fact to the jury earlier in
the sentencing phase).121 The judge refused to provide clarification, stating that the
terms “life imprisonment and death sentence” were to be interpreted by their plain
and ordinary meaning, and parole eligibility was not a proper issue for the jury to
consider.122 After Simmons was sentenced to death, he unsuccessfully appealed his
sentence to the South Carolina Supreme Court, alleging violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court,123 which decided the
case in favor of Simmons by overturning his conviction.124
118 Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284–85 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
119 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
120 Id. at 157.
121 Id. at 156–60. The jury’s confusion on this point was exacerbated by the fact that a state-
wide public opinion survey which was admitted into evidence by the defense showed that only
7.1% of jury-eligible adults thought that defendants sentenced to life without parole would
actually remain in prison for the rest of their lives. Id. at 159. This misperception was not
limited to potential jurors in South Carolina, but extended to Virginia and other states. See
William H. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of “Life” for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on
Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1625 (1989) (“Other recent examina-
tions of capital sentencing jurors’ understanding of parole eligibility corroborate the findings
contained in the National Legal Research Group’s Virginia study. Three other surveys con-
ducted outside Virginia suggest that many capital sentencing jurors harbor misconceptions
about parole and that these misconceptions play a role in the jurors’ penalty determination.”).
122 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160.
123 Id. at 160–61.
124 Id. at 171.
2014] DEATH BY IRRELEVANCE 1277
Much like the earlier death-penalty cases that Lockett sought to make clear, the
holding of Simmons was not easily identifiable when the case was decided (other
than the fact that it reversed and remanded Simmons’s sentence) since there was not
a majority opinion. Nevertheless, both sets of concurrences comprising the plurality
acknowledged that when a capital defendant faces a claim that he will constitute a
future danger to society, and the only alternative to a death sentence is a life sentence
without parole, he has a due process right to inform the jury of this alternative so as
to rebut any inaccurate implication otherwise.125 This understanding of Simmons has
since been reaffirmed by the Court in multiple cases which were both supportive126
and critical127 of the outcome.
B. The Post-Lockett Cases’ Erosion of the Lockett Standard of Relevance
The holdings of the post-Lockett cases which expanded the standard of rele-
vance away from the narrow Footnote 12 categories are crucial for assessing the
constitutionality of Virginia’s prison conditions jurisprudence. Though it is tempting
to argue that there is an obvious constitutional tension between these cases and
Virginia’s prison conditions cases,128 the Court’s express holdings do not directly
preserve a constitutional right to introduce evidence of prison conditions to counter
a claim of future dangerousness in a capital trial. Rather, they preserve only a con-
stitutional right to inform the sentencer of a defendant’s parole ineligibility if sen-
tenced to life in prison for a capital offense.129 Had the former been accomplished, the
Virginia Supreme Court could not have continued to develop its exclusionary stance
on prison conditions evidence whilst the U.S. Supreme Court was simultaneously
125 Id.
126 E.g., Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248 (2002) (“Last Term, we reiterated the
holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, that when ‘a capital defendant’s future dangerousness
is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the jury of
[his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel.’” (quoting
Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 39 (2001))).
127 E.g., O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 153 (1997) (“[T]he rule set out in Simmons
v. South Carolina requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury
that he is parole ineligible if the prosecution argues that he presents a future danger . . . .”).
128 See Jessica M. Tanner, “Continuing Threat” to Whom?: Risk Assessment in Virginia
Capital Sentencing Hearings, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 381, 405–08 (2005) (arguing that the combined
holdings of cases like Crane v. Kentucky, Gardner v. Florida, and Simmons v. South Carolina
“implicate a fundamental constitutional concern . . . [a]s a matter of federal constitutional
law” because “absent the right to provide [prison conditions] information [to jurors], the de-
fendant’s ability to present a complete defense and to rebut the prosecution’s future dan-
gerousness case is severely curtailed”).
129 Id. at 405–06.
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announcing these post-Lockett cases.130 This is underscored by the fact that the con-
stitutional right to introduce prison conditions evidence to address claims of future
dangerousness has never been the question presented in a Supreme Court case, and
indeed the Court’s denial of certiorari without explanation in all of Virginia’s no-
table prison conditions cases131 arguably suggests that the Court did not agree that
such a right should be explicitly recognized.
Nevertheless, there is a decisive takeaway implicit in the Court’s post-Lockett
rulings that directly conflicts with the Lockett standard of relevance. In Shafer v.
South Carolina,132 for example, the Court reaffirmed Simmons by ruling that it was
unconstitutional for the trial judge to deem irrelevant defendant’s attempts to explain
the proper meaning of life without parole to the jury when future dangerousness was
at issue.133 However, this ruling unquestionably applies to any capital defendant in
any state who is subjected to that kind of ruling by any trial judge, and is therefore
completely divorced from the exclusive categories of Footnote 12. To be clear, the
fact that, under a particular state’s criminal code, all defendants found guilty of cap-
ital offenses in that state will either be sentenced to death or life without parole has
absolutely nothing to do with any individualized consideration of those defendants’
prior record, character, or the circumstances of their offense(s).134 Yet in all such cases,
the Court has repeatedly declared that the defendant has a constitutional right to use
the fact of parole ineligibility to defend against future dangerousness allegations.135
Given that most of the expansive post-Lockett cases like Simmons—and even
some expansive cases decided shortly before Lockett such as Gardner v. Florida136—
are plurality decisions without easily identifiable holdings, it is understandable why
the force of their implications has been overlooked in comparison to the more cohe-
sive opinion in Lockett.137 Assuming some of the Justices in the post-Lockett pluralities
130 See supra Part II.B (showing the dates of Virginia’s prison conditions decisions, which
progressed alongside the dates of the Court’s post-Lockett cases in Part III.A). 
131 See supra Part II.B (noting the denial of certiorari in all of Virginia’s prison conditions
cases).
132 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
133 Id. at 51.
134 This incompatibility with the Footnote 12 categories of relevance has been recognized
by others. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Morva v. Virginia, 131 S. Ct. 97 (2010)
(No. 09-10669) [hereinafter Morva Certiorari Petition] (“A defendant’s ineligibility for pa-
role under state law is obviously neither part of ‘the defendant’s past criminal record, prior
history [or] the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense’ . . . .” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
136 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that it was unconstitutional to sen-
tence a capital defendant to death based on confidential future dangerousness evidence that
the defendant was prevented from disputing or explaining).
137 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Even the Lockett opinion, however, suffers from some of the same
forms of ambiguity that permeate the Court’s pre- and post-Lockett decisions (for example,
the majority opinion was divided into different parts which were sustained by a different
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were aware of the logical implication of their decisions with respect to the Lockett
standard of relevance, it may even have played to their advantage in building Court
coalitions to weaken Lockett sub silentio rather than announce some kind of formal
exception, limitation, or reversal.138 But despite the potential motivations behind the
deceivingly narrow holdings of the post-Lockett cases, they unmistakably broaden
the standard of relevance pertaining to the facts that capital defendants can present
to rebut future dangerousness beyond the standard in Lockett, and thus beyond
Virginia’s statutory and case law founded thereon.139 By transcending the limited
categories of Footnote 12, the Court’s post-Lockett cases signaled an important shift
in future dangerousness doctrine: Even state rules of evidence which exclude future
dangerousness rebuttal or mitigation evidence because it is unrelated to defendants’
character, prior record, or offense circumstances can be “arbitrary” or “disproportion-
ate to the purposes they are designed to serve,” and thus constitutionally invalid.140
In short, the Footnote 12 categories of relevance are no longer untouchable—they too
will bruise and bleed if hit hard enough by flagrant injustices of state evidence law.
C. The Relevance of Prison Conditions Evidence in Virginia
After the Erosion of Lockett
Without the formerly unassailable blessing of Lockett, prison conditions evi-
dence is no longer excluded per se by the Footnote 12 categories. But just because
composition of a majority of the Justices, multiple partial concurrences were filed, and justi-
fication for the holding shifted back-and-forth between the Eighth Amendment’s proscription
of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s entitlement of due process).
See id.
138 An official acknowledgment of this kind of trajectory would probably have alienated
certain moderate and conservative Justices concerned with creating yet another Court-imposed
alteration to states’ rules of evidence. This sentiment was rhetorically expressed in Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Simmons:
As I said at the outset, the [evidence] regime imposed by today’s judg-
ment is undoubtedly reasonable as a matter of policy, but I . . . . fear we
have read today the first page of a whole new chapter in the “death-is-
different” jurisprudence which . . . [requires states to] adhere to distinc-
tive rules, more demanding than what the Due Process Clause normally
requires, for admitting evidence of other sorts—Federal Rules of Death
Penalty Evidence, so to speak, which this Court will presumably craft (at
great expense to the swiftness and predictability of justice) year by year.
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 Accord Morva Certiorari Petition, supra note 134, at 15 (“Thus Virginia’s unyielding
determination to exclude from a capital defendant’s case in rebuttal any evidence that is
generally applicable to all capital defendants simply cannot be reconciled with the Simmons
Court’s recognition that a state’s abolition of parole is a fact of . . . importance to any assess-
ment of whether a given convicted murderer is likely to [pose a future danger to society] if
allowed to live.”).
140 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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these categories have lost their doctrinal invincibility does not mean they are so
weak that they are presumed unconstitutional. Just as courts had to be convinced that
evidentiary rules of relevance excluding life-without-parole instructions were un-
justified in future dangerousness cases,141 so too will they need to be sold on the
relevance of prison conditions evidence in such cases.
Setting aside the Court’s consistent denials to hear Virginia prison conditions
cases on appeal,142 this does not seem like a particularly difficult task. As noted in
Part III.A, the minimal relevance standard applicable in state future dangerousness
cases is “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”143 Simmons itself constituted the Court’s validation of the
general improbability between the ability to harm society and residing in prison in-
definitely.144 This is so because there is no such thing as evidence which is neither
relevant nor irrelevant under any American jurisdiction’s rules of evidence,145 and
the Simmons Court certainly did not entitle capital defendants to inform juries of
their alternative life-without-parole sentences because it did not affect the probability
of future dangerousness. If anything, Simmons’s inferred assertion of the relevance
between life imprisonment and future dangerousness is a compliment to the effec-
tiveness of states’ prison systems, not some sort of evidentiary attack on “states’
rights.” Ironically, Virginia’s very own statutes betray its agreement with this as-
sertion of relevance by legally requiring the Virginia Sentencing Commission to
utilize “offender risk assessment instrument[s] for use in all felony cases, based on
a study of Virginia felons, that will be predictive of the relative risk that a felon will
become a threat to public safety [if released from prison].”146 Notwithstanding
141 See supra Part II.B.
142 See supra Part II.B.
143 See supra note 118. This standard of relevance is nearly verbatim of that set out in
Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as well as Rule 2:401 of the Virginia Rules of the
Supreme Court. But the language of Dretke does not seem to hinge upon whether the state
in question has a standard of relevance substantively identical to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence standard. Thus, Justice Scalia’s derogatory description of the expansive post-Lockett
cases as creating “Federal Rules of Death Penalty Evidence” is not entirely rhetorical exag-
geration. See supra note 138.
144 Accord Tanner, supra note 128, at 407 (observing that the Simmons Court approved
“the jury’s future dangerousness decision rest[ing] upon a distinction between the risk
Simmons posed in society at large, and the much-reduced risk he posed in the restrictive
prison setting”).
145 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (dividing all evidence into “relevant evidence” and “irrele-
vant evidence”). Sometimes courts admit evidence that has “conditional relevance,” meaning
that its relevance is not immediately established because it is contingent upon some fact yet
to be proved. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(b). But this is just a temporary form of irrelevance
and does not disturb the relevant-irrelevant dichotomy.
146 VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803(5) (2010).
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indications of conceded relevance to be gleaned from judicial opinions and state
statutes,147 the obvious fact that being in prison makes a person less able (and there-
fore less likely) to harm society is readily accessible through common sense.148
Once the relevance between life imprisonment and future dangerousness to
society is identified, it is but one small step for capital defendants to successfully
argue the relevance between prison conditions and future dangerousness—for syl-
logistically embedded in the acknowledgment that life imprisonment reduces inmate
dangerousness is a predicate sub-acknowledgment about the effectiveness of the
conditions of life imprisonment. As an illustration, imagine instead that the condi-
tions of life imprisonment for the hypothetical client from Part I.A simply meant he
would be housed in a state super-max prison until he is seventy-five years old, after
which he would be assigned to half-way house arrest in some suburban neighbor-
hood due to the need to use his cell for more dangerous inmates, coupled with his
reduced likelihood to be a threat at that age (perhaps as part of a geriatric release
program149). Few would question that being informed of this information would alter
the empirical probability calculus in the sentencer’s mind such that your client’s
alleged future dangerousness is either more or less likely to be true than it was be-
fore being informed of this information. This is notwithstanding the fact that the
information does not pertain to the person’s character, criminal record, or circum-
stances in committing the offense.150
147 Recall the Virginia Supreme Court’s concession that prison conditions evidence can
reduce the likelihood of future dangerousness of inmates. See supra note 108 and accom-
panying text.
148 Accord Solomon, supra note 34, at 71 (describing “evidence explaining the structure,
procedures, and standards that make violent criminal behavior less likely in a prison setting”
as well as noting that “[e]vidence of the safety and precautionary regimens of prison tends
to negate the probability that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence that con-
stitute a continuing serious threat to that society”).
149 Well-informed readers may recognize that this is not currently allowed in Virginia
because inmates convicted for Class 1 felonies under the Virginia Code, see VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-40.01 (2010), (which include capital murder) are not eligible for geriatric release. But
in a nation where two-thirds of the citizenry do not even know the name of one Justice on
the U.S. Supreme Court, it would be the rare juror indeed who brings this knowledge with
him to a capital trial. Juror misperceptions are a largely unchecked problem in our capital
punishment system, as evinced in various parts of this paper.
150 One can readily imagine additional things besides prison conditions evidence that do not
fit the relevance categories of Footnote 12 or the Virginia Code, see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.4(C) (2010), but nevertheless affect the probability that an inmate will be a future danger
to society. For example, consider a defendant who is being housed in a prison before or dur-
ing the guilt phase of his trial and gets in a fight with another inmate or contracts an illness
such that he permanently loses his eyesight or the use of some of his limbs. By the time his
sentencing phase commences, perhaps even the Virginia Supreme Court would not dispute
that he has a correspondingly lower probability of being a future danger to society than he
had at the time he committed the charged offense(s).
1282 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1257
Nor would it be difficult to demonstrate that Virginia’s evidence law excluding
prison conditions evidence151 violates the right to rebut by being disproportionate to
the purpose it is designed to serve.152 The main purpose served by Virginia’s stan-
dard of relevance is to confine jurors’ consideration to facts that minimally matter
to the case over facts that do not.153 But the behavior of jurors in future dangerous-
ness trials further evinces the unduly exclusionary nature of Virginia’s approach to-
ward prison conditions evidence. Today’s jurors are arguably just as bad (if not
worse) than the 92.9% of the jury-eligible population that was polled in South
Carolina at the time Simmons was decided about the statement that life imprison-
ment truly did not carry a possibility for eventual parole.154 Notwithstanding the fact
that capital juries are now assured during the sentencing phase that “life means life,”
they continue to ask about the potential confinement conditions and protocols for
capital defendants in ways that demonstrate their enduring skepticism that today’s
prisons will sufficiently prevent inmates from causing more harm to others inside
or outside the prison.155 This lack of faith in state penal systems only seems likely
to grow with the corresponding increased depth of sensational reporting of prison con-
ditions by the media,156 and is comparatively easy for prosecutors to take advantage
of with defendants who are legally powerless to respond.
151 The Virginia Supreme Court’s specific relevance rule mentioned supra in note 114
doesn’t exclude prison conditions evidence, as the standard is easy to satisfy. Instead, the
Virginia Supreme Court’s rules of evidence were “adopted to implement established princi-
ples under the common law [of Virginia] and not to change . . . [c]ommon law case authority,
whether decided before or after the effective date of the Rules of Evidence [July 1, 2012].” VA.
SUP. CT. R. 2:102. All of Virginia’s prison conditions cases catalogued in Part II.B constitute
Virginia common law.
152 This is one of the disjunctive grounds of unconstitutionality in the general test for the
constitutionality of evidence rules that conflict with the right to rebut. See supra Part II.A.
The other ground is that the practice infringes on a weighty interest of the accused, which is
obviously satisfied in any capital trial where the practice affects the sentence imposed.
153 See, e.g., CHARLES E. FRIEND & KENT SINCLAIR, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA
345–46 (7th ed. 2012) (stating that the rule in Virginia and elsewhere that irrelevant evidence
is never admissible is a “principle based upon the obvious logic that time and effort should
not be wasted upon evidence which is of no probative value in the case. At best, such matter
is useless . . . .”).
154 See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 159 (1994) (plurality opinion). Seventy-
five percent of those surveyed further stated that their judgment as to whether hypothetical
capital defendants would remain in prison indefinitely if convicted would be an “extremely
important” factor in choosing between a punishment of life imprisonment or death if called
as jurors in a capital case. Id.
155 See, for example, the Virginia case of Edward Bell mentioned supra in note 18: “At
Bell’s trial, during penalty phase deliberations, the jury inquired, ‘[u]nderstanding that im-
prisonment for life means no possibility of parole, is there any other way to be released from
prison?’” Bell v. True, 413 F. Supp. 2d 657, 708–09 (W.D. Va. 2006).
156 Expository examples abound from both local and national outlets. For the former cate-
gory, see, for example, Mark Martin, Gays and Lesbians Allowed Conjugal Visits in Prisons, 
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Whatever could be said of capital jury sentencing in 1978 under the Lockett
standard of relevance, it is clear that Virginia’s choice to freeze that standard in time
for nearly thirty-five years has become too heavy-handed of an approach. Unlike
other, more-static aggravators like vileness, capital defendants must climb ever-steeper
slopes of juror scrutiny and speculation in future dangerousness cases in order to stay
alive. For the same reason that the Simmons Court saw fit to broaden the standard
of relevance to include life-means-life instructions in 1991, the constitutional right
to introduce prison conditions evidence in Virginia should be deemed both relevant
and necessary.
IV.
A. The Reason Behind Virginia’s Approach to Prison Conditions Evidence
Because the Virginia Supreme Court has never explicitly announced a coherent
policy rationale as to why it has chosen to adopt such a hostile stance toward prison
conditions evidence, we are left to speculate as to the real reason. To be sure, Vir-
ginia’s stance is certainly not required by the language in Footnote 12.157 Aside from
a straightforward reading of the footnote’s permissive language, the stances that
other jurisdictions have taken on the matter demonstrate that Virginia has made a
deliberate (and unique) choice to enforce an underinclusive standard of relevance
since deciding Cherrix in 1999. Of the thirty-five American jurisdictions that pro-
vide for capital punishment,158 four have made future dangerousness a statutory
S.F. CHRON. (June 1, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Gays-and-lesbians
-allowed-conjugal-visits-in-2590454.php. Perhaps the best-known example of the latter cate-
gory is MSNBC’s Lockup, which is a prison documentary series that covers almost all
aspects of prison conditions in supermax prisons around the country. See generally Lockup
on MSNBC, NBC NEWS, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27118605/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2014). Hundreds of thousands of viewers watch this program every week, sometimes drawing
more attention than popular programs like the Rachel Maddow Show and Wolf Blitzer’s
Situation Room. Mark Joyella, On Friday Night, Highest-Rated Non-Fox Cable News Show
(In Demo) . . . Was MSNBC’s Lockup, MEDIAITE (Apr. 15, 2011, 8:48 PM), http://www
.mediaite.com/tv/on-Friday-night-highest-rated-non-fox-cable-news-show-in-demo-was
-msnbcs-lockup/. Episodes frequently focus on inmates serving life without parole sentences
who do things like kill their cellmates or escape from prison. See, e.g., Videotape Transcript:
Lockup—Inside Iowa State Penitentiary, LIVEDASH (July 11, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://livedash
.ark.com/transcript/lockup-(inside_iowa_state_penitentiary)/5304/MSNBC/Sunday_July_11
_2010/365708/; Videotape Transcript: Lockup: Raw—Criminal Minds, LIVEDASH (July 17,
2010, 9:00 PM), http://livedash.ark.com/transcript/lockup_raw-(criminal_minds)/5304/MSNBC
/Saturday_July_17_2010/374603/.
157 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
158 This includes thirty-three states as well as federal courts and U.S. military courts.
States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
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aggravator159 and twelve have made it a permissible, non-statutory aggravator.160 Of
these future dangerousness jurisdictions, there is no indication that any of them ex-
clude prison conditions evidence as categorically irrelevant.161
Some of the language in the Virginia Supreme Court’s prison conditions cases
suggests that the court is trying to enforce unspoken standards of morality, reliabil-
ity, and fairness, rather than a standard of relevance. In Burns, for example, the court
indicated that the future dangerousness inquiry should focus on whether a defendant
would constitute a future danger to society, as opposed to whether he could.162 Thus,
even if prison conditions render a defendant unable to be a future danger to society
until the day he dies, the jury must further consider whether the defendant would
nevertheless present a threat to society if he were hypothetically unrestrained by
prison conditions. This hypothetical consideration would only be relevant in a state
where there are either no prisons, or there is a possibility for the capital convict in
question to be paroled. Because Virginia is not such a state, this inquiry transcends
the realm of relevance, effectively requiring an assessment of capital defendants’
character.163 It is debatable whether conducting such a character assessment as part
of a capital aggravator would be constitutional at all,164 but clearly the Virginia
Supreme Court should not be permitted to sneak it into state evidence law under the
guise of a relevance standard.165 If the court thinks that jurors should have the
159 See Vartkessian, supra note 36, at 450 n.16.
160 Id. at 450 n.17.
161 See, e.g., Tanner, supra note 128, at 391 n.82 (stating that “[o]ther capital jurisdictions
have considered and permit the introduction of prison life evidence such as that currently
excluded in Virginia” and listing cases from the federal system, Missouri, California, Georgia,
and Louisiana as examples); see also, e.g., Morva Certiorari Petition, supra note 134, at
25–30 (stating that “Virginia’s stance on this issue of federal constitutional law is in direct
conflict with the overwhelming weight of authority in those state and federal courts where
future dangerousness is a prominent feature of the prosecution’s case for imposing the death
penalty” and listing cases from the federal system, Texas, Oregon, Oklahoma, Illinois, and
Tennessee as examples).
162 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
163 See Morva Certiorari Petition, supra note 134, at 12–13 (“Morva observed that by
construing Virginia’s ‘continuing threat’ statutory aggravating factor as containing such an
illogical and counter-factual limitation . . . the state court had effectively redefined the con-
tinuing threat factor as . . . . whether he was merely a person of ‘dangerous character.’”) It
is no coincidence that “character” is one of the categories of relevant evidence listed in
Footnote 12 because character is relevant if it is assumed that the defendant will be able to
act based upon the inclinations of his character in a given environment. But prison conditions
evidence negates this assumption; even if a defendant’s violent or sadistic character would
incline him to hurt others until the day he dies, he is prevented from carrying out such actions
because he is contained in a secure environment where those actions are not possible.
164 See id. at 30–34.
165 This is not the only future dangerousness context where the Virginia Supreme Court
has effectively required jurors to assess the moral character of capital defendants under the
banner of relevance. See Justin D. Flamm, Due Process on the “Uncharted Seas of Irrele-
vance”: Limiting the Presence of Victim Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing After Payne
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discretion to essentially judge which kinds of defendants deserve to die based on
objectionable character, it must wait until such discretion is conferred upon juries
by the state legislature.
The court’s reasons for rejecting the prison conditions evidence in Morva also
seem foreign to any notion of relevance.166 There, the court explained that because
Morva’s prison conditions evidence reduced the likelihood of him being a future
danger to society, but also reduced that likelihood for all inmates serving a life-
without-parole sentence, his evidence was too general to be relevant.167 Rationally
speaking, this argument is invalid. Things that are generally relevant to groups of
similarly situated individuals can also be (and frequently are) relevant to the particu-
lar individuals themselves. For example, if prisoners were routinely sent to locations
where it would be impossible for them to return to society, such as prisons located
deep under the ocean or on the moon, this would unquestionably nullify the proba-
bility of each prisoner’s capacity for future dangerousness even though it also nul-
lifies the probability of every prisoner’s capacity for future dangerousness. But one
need not resort to such fantastic scenarios in rejecting the court’s argument, as
Simmons v. South Carolina provides a perfect counter-example. Clearly, the fact that
capital convicts are ineligible for parole reduces the probability of each and every
capital convict’s capacity to be a future danger to society at large, and it would be
absurd to deem parole ineligibility “irrelevant” for this reason.168 Instead, the Morva
court seems to be concerned with the reliability of prison conditions evidence.169
Reliability is a central concern of evidence law, and is the rationale behind many
exclusionary rules of evidence.170 But reliability is clearly a separate evidentiary
standard of admissibility that must be met in addition to relevance, and the two
v. Tennessee, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295, 332 (1999) (“The Virginia Supreme Court chose
to permit the admission of victim impact evidence not to portray the probability of any future
acts of the defendant, but rather to demonstrate the individual’s culpability for a past act—the
particular murder at issue. Because the acknowledged purpose of victim impact evidence is
to demonstrate an aspect of the defendant’s moral guilt, and not to demonstrate the defen-
dant’s propensity for violence, victim impact evidence is not relevant to the future danger-
ousness aggravator.”).
166 See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
168 If the court truly has an inductive concern that data about groups does not directly
establish anything about a particular individual, it should accept the group data as condition-
ally relevant subject to further proof that such data can be extrapolated to the capital defendant
in the case sub judice. See supra note 145 (summarizing the concept of conditional relevance).
It is hard to imagine this being a legitimate concern given the kinds of group data extrapola-
tion that typifies multiple kinds of civil cases such as toxic tort and social syndrome cases.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28, at 660–66.
169 See Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 562–63 (Va. 2009).
170 Classic examples are the rules against hearsay and character evidence. See FED. R.
EVID. 802; FED. R. EVID. 404.
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should not be confused.171 Absent a rule which specifically provides for the general
exclusion of certain kinds of evidence, courts must address reliability concerns
through a case-by-case application of general rules of evidence designed for that
purpose,172 rather than through judicially created categorical stances.
The only other way to make sense of the Morva court’s reasoning is that it is
trying to prevent capital defendants from profiting from the general effectiveness of
state prisons during sentencing. From a fairness standpoint, it may seem counter-
intuitive to allow capital defendants to avoid execution by pointing to the effective-
ness of the very mechanisms that are designed to punish and restrain them for their
crimes.173 Though much of evidence law is grounded upon notions of fairness rather
than relevance,174 the court should not be allowed to incoherently mix the two in
order to uphold capital convictions on appeal. As with reliability concerns, the court
would need a specific rule of evidence to stand upon in order to categorically ex-
clude prison conditions evidence on the basis of unfairness. For good reason, no
such rule exists in Virginia or any other state.
B. Implementing a Solution
As evinced by the arguments advanced in Virginia’s prison conditions cases,175
capital defense advocates have launched thorough attacks on Virginia’s exclusionary
stance.176 Undoubtedly, these will need to continue if progress is to be made, and
171 The rules against hearsay and character evidence are again good examples to use, as
both operate to exclude evidence which is viewed as unreliable notwithstanding its relevance
to issues at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 802; FED. R. EVID. 404.
172 These include, inter alia, rules having to do with the authenticity of documents or phys-
ical articles of evidence, and qualifications of witnesses who seek to testify as experts. See
FED. R. EVID. 702; FED. R. EVID. 901.
173 This would also explain the court’s general use of the phrase “prison life evidence” as
mentioned supra in note 58. By portraying prison conditions evidence as “what prison life
would be like for [the defendant] if he received a life sentence,” the court seems to manifest
an unsympathetic attitude toward the fate of those who commit capital crimes, rather than
a view about the relevance of incarceration conditions to capital defendants’ future danger-
ousness. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28, at 452 (discussing the policy of
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures because it is “unfair to introduce against
a person, over his objection, evidence that he behaved responsibly after the fact” despite the
fact that such behavior may be relevant to negligence, fault, and feasibility). Federal evidence
law takes a similar stance toward evidence of settlement negotiations, plea bargains, and
proof of payment of medical expenses. See FED. R. EVID. 408; FED. R. EVID. 409; FED. R.
EVID. 410.
175 See supra Part II.B.
176 See, e.g., Lara D. Gass, Note, Virginia’s Redefinition of the “Future Dangerousness”
Aggravating Factor: Unprecedented, Unfounded, and Unconstitutional, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1887, 1922–32 (2013).
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there are signs that such arguments are beginning to succeed. Until Porter, there
were no dissenting opinions pertaining to the Virginia Supreme Court’s exclusion
of prison conditions evidence. In Porter, however, Justice Koontz dissented from
the majority’s rejection of Porter’s expert prison conditions evidence.177 He began
by asserting that “the defendant has a fundamental right to introduce appropriate
evidence to rebut the Commonwealth’s evidence” regarding the future danger-
ousness aggravator,178 and proceeded to explain why Porter’s “proffered [expert]
testimony was relevant to the issue of Porter’s future dangerousness because it was
sufficiently specific to Porter based on Porter’s individual characteristics . . . the
particular facts of [his] history and background, and the circumstances of his of-
fense.”179 Most importantly, Justice Koontz cautioned the majority about the broader
constitutional and policy implications of maintaining its current trajectory:
I am compelled to warn that the various issues raised in this case
may tend to exemplify certain aspects of the conduct of capital
murder trials in this Commonwealth that slowly, but inexorably,
will erode public confidence that the death penalty is being im-
posed in a fair and consistent manner. Surely, the citizens of
Virginia expect . . . that [our] courts . . . will conduct death pen-
alty trials with due regard for the constitutional and statutory
safeguards that are meant to ensure that the maximum penalty
will be imposed only in those instances where it is truly neces-
sary to advance the cause of justice and secure the lives and
welfare of the people. Moreover, it should be expected, and jus-
tice demands, that even in cases where a sentence of death may
be appropriate, its imposition will occur through a strict and
faithful adherence to due process of law. If the courts empow-
ered to sit in judgment over those accused of typically heinous
crimes fail to take the greatest care in assuring the fairness of
[capital] proceedings . . . then it must inevitably follow in time
that the death penalty statutes of this Commonwealth will no
longer pass constitutional muster.180
Justice Koontz was joined by Justice Keenan when he dissented again in Morva,
the very next prison conditions case to follow Porter.181 Because Morva’s expert
prison conditions evidence was even more individualized than Porter’s (albeit not
177 Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415, 449–54 (Va. 2008) (Koontz, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 452.
179 Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180 Id.
181 See Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 568–74 (Va. 2009) (Koontz, J.,
dissenting).
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enough to persuade the majority), Justice Koontz readily found that it “facially
appear[ed]” to satisfy the court’s relevance standard from Lockett.182 He concluded
that the absence of Morva’s prison conditions evidence left Morva “without the
constitutionally required basic tools of an adequate defense that comport with a
defendant’s due process rights.”183 Finally, Justice Koontz criticized the majority’s
general conception of prison conditions evidence, arguing that prison conditions
evidence is not only “relevant,” but also “essential to achieving an individualized
prediction” “when calculating the risk of future violent acts.”184
In addition to the tenor of these dissenting opinions, the fact that they were filed
consecutively in two of Virginia’s more-recent prison conditions cases is encouraging.
The Virginia Supreme Court has never before been this receptive to reconsidering
its exclusionary stance, and these dissents provide useful ammunition for advocates
seeking to admit prison conditions evidence. Not only do they contain explicit ac-
knowledgments of the incompatibility between Virginia’s exclusionary stance and
due process doctrine based on right-to-rebut jurisprudence,185 they also remind critics
that accepting prison conditions evidence as relevant will not over-equip capital
defendants to rebut the future dangerousness aggravator. The Morva dissent in par-
ticular noted that the prosecution did not challenge the scientific basis and method-
ology of Morva’s proffered expert testimony, nor the expert’s personal qualifications
to conduct prison risk assessments analyses.186 The dissenting justices also pointed
out that even if Morva’s prison conditions evidence was deemed relevant, the jury
would still be required to assess the persuasive weight of the evidence.187 Along this
same vein, Simmons itself noted that:
[T]he fact that a defendant is parole ineligible does not prevent
the State from arguing that the defendant poses a future danger.
The State is free to argue that the defendant will pose a danger to
others in prison and that executing him is the only means of elim-
inating the threat to the safety of other inmates or prison staff.188
All of these observations highlight the various conventions of the adversarial process
that would still be available to prosecutors alleging future dangerousness despite the
acceptance of prison conditions’ relevance in future dangerousness cases.189
182 Id. at 572.
183 Id. at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184 Id. at 572. This was precisely the same argument made seven years earlier in Bell v.
Commonwealth. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
185 See Morva, 683 S.E.2d at 568–74; Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415, 449–54
(Va. 2008) (Koontz, J., dissenting).
186 Morva, 683 S.E.2d at 572.
187 Id. at 569.
188 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 n.5 (1994) (plurality opinion).
189 This is not to mention the fact that prosecutors need not prove the future dangerousness
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As ironic as it may be that the Virginia Supreme Court could beat the U.S. Su-
preme Court to a solution, this route seems optimal for both parties. By waiting for
Virginia to solve its own problem on its own terms, the Court avoids deviating from
its preferred policy of nonintervention in state evidence law.190 However, if Virginia
does not continue to show meaningful signs of improvement, the Court should be
prepared to bite the bullet and rectify the situation. The Court’s hesitance to tread
into the realm of state evidence law in capital cases is institutionally convenient, and
perhaps even noble. Unfortunately, Virginia exemplifies that it can also be deadly.
No matter the appeal of the cliché analogy that states should be left alone in order
to develop into diverse policy laboratories,191 the unmistakable takeaway from the
Court’s modern capital jurisprudence is that states should be given very little leeway
to toy with capital defendant’s evidentiary protections. Otherwise, capital defen-
dants’ chances of surviving in our legal system become so arbitrary that they depend
more on the name of the state where the crimes were committed than the nature of
the crimes themselves.192 This is intolerable under our Constitution, and the Tenth
Amendment should never be construed as granting states immunity from complying
with due process.193
CONCLUSION
Acknowledging the right of Virginians to introduce prison conditions evidence
in rebuttal to allegations of future dangerousness will reaffirm our most important
aggravator at all if they can alternatively establish the vileness aggravator. See supra note 5
and accompanying text.
190 As mentioned in multiple parts of this paper, this federalism concern is a major force
in the development of the Court’s capital jurisprudence, including future dangerousness prec-
edent. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
191 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867, 869 (1983) (“When Justice Brandeis originally
analogized the states to laboratories in need of freedom to experiment, he was dissenting
from a decision by the Court applying a now-discredited interpretation of the Due Process
Clause to strike down an Oklahoma statute regulating the sale and distribution of ice. . . .
Since then, however, the power of the States-as-laboratories metaphor has propelled Justice
Brandeis’ concept far beyond the sphere of social and economic regulation. Now we find the
metaphor employed to justify this Court’s abstention from reaching an important issue in-
volving the rights of individual defendants under the Federal Constitution.”).
192 This is already the case to some extent between the large number of jurisdictions that
practice capital punishment and the smaller group that does not, but the analysis is more
properly directed at the comparative differences only within the former group.
193 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of
its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments . . . .”).
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constitutional creed to equip all defendants—especially those accused of capital
offenses—with a balanced opportunity to defend their lives, liberties, and property
against any state seeking to curtail due process. Strangely enough, Virginia gener-
ally has a very undemanding standard of relevance. As one eminent Virginia evi-
dentiary authority describes, “Virginia law is very liberal on defining the scope of
relevant evidence,” and “the standard for finding relevance is exceedingly low . . . .
If the proof is ‘some help’ in determining a fact, it meets th[e] relevancy standard.”194
Thus, “every fact, however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the prob-
ability or improbability of a fact in issue is relevant.”195 This is why, for example,
Virginia courts regularly accept such tenuous arguments like one asserting that be-
cause marijuana is found in the same vehicle as someone, he is now more likely to
be someone possessing a gun which he uses to defend himself in “the underground
drug world.”196
It is only when a Virginia defendant stands to lose his very existence to the ac-
cusation that he will be a future danger to society that more rigorous empirical
metaphysics spring forth from the state’s common law to straightjacket his defense.
He is permitted to address this accusation not by proving what he could do in the
future, but what he would do in the future if he could, lest he present evidence that
incidentally affects the probability of some other Virginia inmate’s future danger-
ousness. Meanwhile, the prosecution is allowed to resort to such unreliable and
irrelevant evidence as unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct197 and victim impact
statements198 to prove the defendant’s future dangerousness to society. Forced to
engage in this despicable evidentiary dance on the only stage in America where it
is conducted, the defendant embarks on a years-long appellate shuffle to his final
destination, where he is told something along the lines of the following:
194 FRIEND & SINCLAIR, supra note 153, at 342–43.
195 Thomas v. Commonwealth, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Va. Elec.
& Power Co. v. Dungee, 520 S.E.2d 164, 179 (Va. 1999)).
196 Thomas, 607 S.E.2d at 744–45.
197 See, e.g., Beaver v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 342, 346–47 (Va. 1987). Ironically,
unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct are not considered “relevant” for sentencing defendants
for non-capital felonies. Byrd v. Commonwealth, 517 S.E.2d 243, 245 (Va. 1999) (“We can
discern no relationship between the purposes of sentencing and the jury’s role in determining
appropriate punishment in non-capital cases that would make evidence of nolle prossed
charges relevant to the jury’s task.”). Selectively lowering the evidentiary standard of both
relevance and reliability in favor of the prosecution during capital sentencing is blatantly
incompatible with the fundamental design of the Court’s capital jurisprudence discussed in
Part II.A (in other words, that the Constitution requires capital defendants to be afforded the
greatest evidentiary protections in both the guilt and penalty phases of trials).
198 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(A1) (2010); Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d
899, 903–04 (Va. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997). For an argument that victim im-
pact evidence is irrelevant to Virginia’s future dangerousness aggravator, see Flamm, supra
note 165, at 323–24.
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The fact that being an inmate in a single cell, locked down
twenty-three hours a day, with individual or small group exer-
cise, and shackled movement under escort would greatly reduce
your opportunity for serious violence toward others, is not “a
fact, however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the
probability or improbability of” your future dangerousness.199
It is no longer difficult for the defendant to see why he was not the first or the
last Virginia defendant to make this argument, nor why the large majority of death
sentences comprising Virginia’s second-highest number of executions in the nation’s
modern era of capital punishment involved the same future dangerousness façade.200
What remains difficult to determine is whether there is a possibly more unjust way
to administer the law of evidence—to inflict death by irrelevance.
199 This quotation was formed by combining language from Morva v. Commonwealth, 683
S.E.2d 553, 565 (Va. 2009), with Virginia’s otherwise accommodating standard of relevance
as described in Charles Friend’s and Kent Sinclair’s The Law of Evidence in Virginia.
FRIEND & SINCLAIR, supra note 153, at 342–43.
200 Morva Certiorari Petition, supra note 134, at 30; see also Virginia Capital Litigation
Data, VIRGINIA CAP. CASE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://vc3.org/resources/page.asp?pageid=561
(last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (click “Download Excel Spreadsheet” hyperlink) (showing that out
of the 195 capital convictions in Virginia between 1978 and 2011, the future dangerousness
aggravator was proven in 112 of those cases, amounting to 57.4%).
